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broader context of the Mediterranean
naval war. If that war’s object was
communications, the Germans
achieved the majority of the tactical
successes that produced operational
and strategic consequences. Even
according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent
of Allied losses during the period of
Six Victories resulted from German
actions (p. 259). Second Sirte is a
clear example of this; the delay the
Italian surface forces imposed was
not decisive, because it was German
aircraft that sank the enemy ships.
Despite this, O’Hara concludes that
the three Italian victories led to
Axis maritime control of the central
Mediterranean up to November 1942,
broken only by the coming of American naval reinforcements (p. 257).
This conclusion is not convincing.
First, it seems to confound surface
predominance with maritime control.
During summer–fall 1942, intelligence,
air, and underwater predominance—
critical elements of maritime control
during World War II—were in the
hands of the British, enabling them to
disrupt Axis communications despite
enemy surface predominance. Second,
this trend already was emerging
during the first period considered
by Six Victories (fall 1941). Current
Anglo-American and Italian scholarly
work agrees that the increased security
of Axis transports during early 1942
depended on the decline of Malta as an
operative base, itself caused by increasing German air attacks. O’Hara seems
unable to shake this argument, because
he only identifies a chronological connection in the improved situation of
the Axis convoys after the three Italian
victories (p. 127), possibly mistaking
correlation for causation. Surface
preponderance, the main result of the
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Italian victories, could not stop air and
submarine attacks against Axis convoys, Britain’s primary weapons against
enemy communications, which indeed
regained their momentum when German airpower shifted from the central
Mediterranean to assist Rommel.
In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a
detailed reconstruction of the naval
actions described, deserving credit
for proving that the effectiveness of
the Italian navy at a tactical level was
better than Anglo-American studies
usually have acknowledged. Less
convincing is the analysis of the
operational and strategic consequences
of the six “victories,” owing to an overemphasis on surface warfare, which
was only a part—and possibly not the
most important one—of the Mediterranean naval scenario in 1941–42.
Readers searching this book for lessons
relevant to modern antiaccess warfare
will need to bear this in mind.
FABIO DE NINNO

On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Washington’s Beltway, by Arnold L. Punaro, with David Poyer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2016. 249 pages. $29.95.

On War and Politics is a remarkable
autobiography. It explores the life
and professional careers of Arnold L.
Punaro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
(USMCR) major general and congressional insider; it also is a remarkable
portrayal of the day-to-day workings
of Congress and the Pentagon, so it
will appeal to a broad range of readers
interested in national-security affairs.
Punaro spent over thirty-five years as
a USMCR officer and worked closely
with the chairman of the Senate Armed
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Services Committee, Senator Samuel A.
Nunn Jr. (D-GA), for almost twenty-four
years. Nunn played an important role
in almost every major piece of defense
legislation and understood the intricacies of power politics inside the Beltway.
Punaro grew up a devout Roman
Catholic, and as a young boy entered
the seminary to become a priest, but
eventually left and attended Spring Hill
College for his undergraduate degree.
On graduation, he started talking to
military recruiters to avoid the draft, because his father warned him, “You don’t
want to get drafted. You’ll go to Asia
as an infantryman, and there’s nothing
grand and glorious about war” (p. 18).
Punaro was particularly impressed by
the sharp uniform the Marine recruiter
wore, so he decided to join the Corps.
Punaro’s dry wit and sense of humor
are evident throughout the book.
Describing his experiences during
Officer Candidate School (OCS) at
Quantico, he writes, “After being
shouted into a haphazard queue, I began
my introduction to the three eternal
truths in the military: hurry up and
wait, endless paperwork, and constant
changes to ‘the word.’” Punaro excelled
at OCS and the Basic School, and after
graduation got his “dream job”: orders to
Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader.
Punaro’s combat tour in Vietnam shaped
the course of his subsequent life. Punaro
starts the book with an incident in which
he almost died. “None of us would come
back the same. Some wouldn’t come
back at all, especially from my area of
operation, which held the dubious distinction of having the most casualties of
any in the combat zone” (p. 26). Punaro
learned well the leadership lessons of
an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam.
“We grew to respect each other, and
my Marines gained confidence in my
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leadership for two primary reasons:
I never got lost, and they knew that
I wouldn’t put them in more danger
than absolutely necessary” (p. 50).
After nearly four months in Vietnam—
almost all in the field—Punaro was
seriously wounded. One of his fellow
Marines, Corporal Roy Lee Hammonds,
attempted to help Punaro but was killed
in the firefight. “I had no doubt that the
bullets that had torn through his protective gear would have ripped me to shreds
had he not thrown himself between
me and the snipers” (p. 55). Punaro
was medevaced to a naval hospital in
Okinawa. He always has remembered
Hammonds’s actions that day.
On his return from Vietnam, Punaro
was assigned to Marine Corps Base
Quantico and became involved in
planning social events for the training
battalion. His wit and humor show
when he describes the art of doing so
in cooperation with officers’ wives.
“It was an early lesson in Washington
ways: if you don’t mind kissing some
butts, you can go far” (p. 62).
After leaving the active-duty Marine
Corps, Punaro entered the University
of Georgia’s Grady School of Journalism. He excelled in his graduate
studies and was offered a job with
Senator Nunn. “Little did I know that
I was signing up for a decade’s tour
on Nunn’s personal staff, and then
another fourteen years on the Armed
Services Committee[—]nearly a
quarter-century with the Senate and the
senator, in one way or another” (p. 72).
Punaro weaves a tapestry of crucial
events in our nation’s history through
different presidencies—those of Carter,
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush
II—with details available only from
a congressional insider. Moreover,
he gives the reader a front-row seat
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on the development of American
national security under each of these
presidents. “As we wrapped up eight
years of a defense buildup and both
positive and negative developments,
from Iran-Contra to the Gorbachev
era, we thought we had seen it all. But
we could not imagine the tumult the
next years would bring” (p. 150).
Perhaps the best chapter is the last:
“Lessons Learned.” Punaro provides
a short synopsis of important lessons
learned throughout his illustrious
careers in the military, the Senate,
and private business. These are
lessons distilled after a lifetime spent
in leadership positions and working
with other great leaders. He writes,
“If today’s leaders could find the
courage to apply these, they would
be well on their way to solving most
of today’s legislative gridlock, finger
pointing, and failure to act on even
the most pressing issues” (p. 209).
The book is much more than a collection of autobiographical anecdotes.
Punaro and his coauthor provide keen
insights on important national-security
issues in our nation’s history that many
of us have never heard before, told from
a Washington insider’s perspective. This
book is a must-read for young military
officers. I wholeheartedly recommend it.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

“I Am Determined to Live or Die on Board My
Ship”: The Life of Admiral John Inglis; An American in the Georgian Navy, by Jim Tildesley. Kibworth Beauchamp, U.K.: Matador, 2019. 561
pages. ₤19.99.

This five-hundred-page biography
is longer than many devoted to the
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world’s most famous admirals. One
has to search quite carefully in the
literature on the Royal Navy during
the American Revolution and the
wars of the French Revolution to find
even a passing reference to John Inglis
(1743–1807). During his forty-two
years of active naval service, Inglis
reached the coveted rank of post captain.
Following his retirement from active
service in 1799, he rose by seniority up
the ranks of “yellow” half-pay admirals,
eventually becoming a vice admiral.
The author of this work, Jim Tildesley,
former director of the Scottish Maritime
Museum, has unearthed—with admirable diligence, in more than twenty
archives in England, Scotland, and
the United States—the documentary
evidence of Inglis’s life. The result of
many years’ labor, Tildesley’s book
provides a fascinating and lucid
account that serves as a valuable case
study of a diligent and successful naval
officer who retired as a captain.
From other historians, we know that
two-hundred-some captains were
serving in the fleet during Inglis’s
career, and only a small percentage of
them could rise to flag rank on active
service; then, as now, reaching the rank
of captain meant that an officer had
had a typical successful career. Thus,
Inglis is part of a significant group of
career naval officers worthy of study.
Tildesley follows Inglis’s life and career,
seemingly using every scrap of paper
that relates to him, his family, and his
ships, from log- and muster books
to municipal tax records as well as
newspapers, estate records, letters from
family friends and acquaintances, and
a wide range of official reports. The
result is a remarkably complete view
of an ordinary naval captain’s life.
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